

# The Method of Pairwise Comparisons

Suggestion from a Math 105 student (8/31/11): **Hold a knockout tournament between candidates.**

- ▶ This satisfies the Condorcet Criterion! A Condorcet candidate will win all his/her matches, and therefore win the tournament. (Better yet, seeding doesn't matter!)
- ▶ **But**, if there is no Condorcet candidate, then it's not clear what will happen.
- ▶ Using preference ballots, we can actually hold a **round-robin** tournament instead of a knockout.

# The Method of Pairwise Comparisons (§1.5)

## The Method of Pairwise Comparisons

Proposed by Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794)

- ▶ Compare each two candidates head-to-head.
- ▶ Award each candidate one point for each head-to-head victory.
- ▶ The candidate with the most points wins.

# The Method of Pairwise Comparisons

| <b>Number of Voters</b> | <b>14</b> | <b>10</b> | <b>8</b> | <b>4</b> | <b>1</b> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1st choice              | A         | C         | D        | B        | C        |
| 2nd choice              | B         | B         | C        | D        | D        |
| 3rd choice              | C         | D         | B        | C        | B        |
| 4th choice              | D         | A         | A        | A        | A        |

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Compare A to B.

- ▶ 14 voters prefer A.
- ▶  $10+8+4+1 = 23$  voters prefer B.
- ▶ B wins the pairwise comparison and gets 1 point.

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| 3rd choice              | C         | D         | B        | C        | B        |
| 4th choice              | D         | A         | A        | A        | A        |

Compare C to D:

- ▶  $14+10+1 = 25$  voters prefer C.
- ▶  $8+4 = 12$  voters prefer D.
- ▶ C wins the pairwise comparison and gets 1 point.

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- ▶ Compare A to C... A to D... B to C... B to D...

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| 3rd choice              | C         | D         | B        | C        | B        |
| 4th choice              | D         | A         | A        | A        | A        |

|   | A | B | C | D | <b>Wins</b> | <b>Losses</b> | <b>Points</b> |
|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| A |   |   |   |   |             |               |               |
| B |   |   |   |   |             |               |               |
| C |   |   |   |   |             |               |               |
| D |   |   |   |   |             |               |               |

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| Number of Voters | 14       | 10       | 8        | 4        | 1        |
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| 1st choice       | <b>A</b> | C        | D        | <b>B</b> | C        |
| 2nd choice       | <b>B</b> | <b>B</b> | C        | D        | D        |
| 3rd choice       | C        | D        | <b>B</b> | C        | <b>B</b> |
| 4th choice       | D        | <b>A</b> | <b>A</b> | <b>A</b> | <b>A</b> |

|   | A  | B  | C | D | Wins | Losses | Points |
|---|----|----|---|---|------|--------|--------|
| A |    | 14 |   |   |      |        |        |
| B | 23 |    |   |   |      |        |        |
| C |    |    |   |   |      |        |        |
| D |    |    |   |   |      |        |        |



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| 2nd choice       | B  | B  | C | D | D |
| 3rd choice       | C  | D  | B | C | B |
| 4th choice       | D  | A  | A | A | A |

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| 2nd choice       | <b>B</b> | <b>B</b> | <b>C</b> | D        | D        |
| 3rd choice       | <b>C</b> | D        | <b>B</b> | <b>C</b> | <b>B</b> |
| 4th choice       | D        | A        | A        | A        | A        |

|   | A  | B  | C  | D  | Wins | Losses | Points |
|---|----|----|----|----|------|--------|--------|
| A |    | 14 | 14 | 14 |      |        |        |
| B | 23 |    | 18 |    |      |        |        |
| C | 23 | 19 |    |    |      |        |        |
| D | 23 |    |    |    |      |        |        |

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|   | A  | B  | C  | D  | <b>Wins</b> | <b>Losses</b> | <b>Points</b> |
|---|----|----|----|----|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| A |    | 14 | 14 | 14 |             |               |               |
| B | 23 |    | 18 | 28 |             |               |               |
| C | 23 | 19 |    | 25 |             |               |               |
| D | 23 | 9  | 12 |    |             |               |               |

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| 4th choice              | D         | A         | A        | A        | A        |

|   | A  | B  | C  | D  | <b>Wins</b> | <b>Losses</b> | <b>Points</b> |
|---|----|----|----|----|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| A |    | 14 | 14 | 14 | —           | B,C,D         | 0             |
| B | 23 |    | 18 | 28 | A,C         | D             | 2             |
| C | 23 | 19 |    | 25 | A,B,D       | —             | 3             |
| D | 23 | 9  | 12 |    | A           | B,C           | 1             |

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| 2nd choice       | B  | B  | C | D | D |
| 3rd choice       | C  | D  | B | C | B |
| 4th choice       | D  | A  | A | A | A |

|   | A  | B  | C  | D  | Wins  | Losses | Points |
|---|----|----|----|----|-------|--------|--------|
| A |    | 14 | 14 | 14 | —     | B,C,D  | 0      |
| B | 23 |    | 18 | 28 | A,C   | D      | 2      |
| C | 23 | 19 |    | 25 | A,B,D | —      | 3      |
| D | 23 | 9  | 12 |    | A     | B,C    | 1      |

**Winner!**

# Evaluating the Method of Pairwise Comparisons

- ▶ The Method of Pairwise Comparisons satisfies the Majority Criterion.  
(A majority candidate will win every pairwise comparison.)

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- ▶ The Method of Pairwise Comparisons satisfies the Majority Criterion.  
(A majority candidate will win every pairwise comparison.)
  
- ▶ The Method of Pairwise Comparisons satisfies the Condorcet Criterion.  
(A Condorcet candidate will win every pairwise comparison — that's what a Condorcet candidate is!)

# Evaluating the Method of Pairwise Comparisons

- ▶ The Method of Pairwise Comparisons satisfies the Public-Enemy Criterion.

(If there is a public enemy, s/he will lose every pairwise comparison.)



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(Ranking Candidate X higher can only help X in pairwise comparisons.)

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(Ranking Candidate X higher can only help X in pairwise comparisons.)

**Does the Method of Pairwise Comparisons have any drawbacks?**

# How Many Pairwise Comparisons?

**Problem #1:** It's somewhat inefficient. How many pairwise comparisons are necessary if there are  $N$  candidates?  
How many spaces are there in the crosstable?

|   | A | B | C | D | E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A |   |   |   |   |   |
| B |   |   |   |   |   |
| C |   |   |   |   |   |
| D |   |   |   |   |   |
| E |   |   |   |   |   |

# How Many Pairwise Comparisons?

- ▶  $N^2$  squares in crosstable
- ▶  $N$  squares on the main diagonal don't count
- ▶ Other squares all come in pairs

$$\text{Number of comparisons} = \frac{N^2 - N}{2} = \frac{N(N - 1)}{2}.$$

# Be Careful!

Number of pairwise comparisons with  $N$  candidates:

$$\frac{N(N - 1)}{2}.$$

Number of points on a Borda count ballot with  $N$  candidates:

$$\frac{N(N + 1)}{2}.$$

(To remember which is which, work out a small example, like  $N = 3$ .)

# Evaluating the Method of Pairwise Comparisons

**Problem #2** (the “rock-paper-scissors problem”):

Ties are very common under the Method of Pairwise Comparisons.

# Evaluating the Method of Pairwise Comparisons

| <b>Number of voters</b> | <b>4</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>6</b> |
|-------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1st                     | A        | B        | C        |
| 2nd                     | B        | C        | A        |
| 3rd                     | C        | A        | B        |

- ▶ The Method of Pairwise Comparisons results in a three-way tie.
- ▶ Under any other system we have discussed, C would win.

# Comparison of Voting Methods

|                      | Maj | Cond | PE  | Mono |
|----------------------|-----|------|-----|------|
| Plurality            | Yes | No   | No  | Yes  |
| Borda Count          | No  | No   | Yes | Yes  |
| PWE                  | Yes | No   | Yes | No   |
| Pairwise Comparisons | Yes | Yes  | Yes | Yes  |

Maj = Majority; Cond = Condorcet;

PE = Public-Enemy; Mono = Monotonicity



# The IIA Criterion

| <b>Number of voters</b> | <b>9</b> | <b>11</b> | <b>7</b> | <b>6</b> | <b>3</b> |
|-------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1st                     | A        | B         | D        | C        | D        |
| 2nd                     | C        | A         | B        | A        | C        |
| 3rd                     | D        | C         | C        | D        | B        |
| 4th                     | B        | D         | A        | B        | A        |

(1) Who wins?

# The IIA Criterion

| Number of voters | 9 | 11 | 7 | 6 | 3 |
|------------------|---|----|---|---|---|
| 1st              | A | B  | D | C | D |
| 2nd              | C | A  | B | A | C |
| 3rd              | D | C  | C | D | B |
| 4th              | B | D  | A | B | A |

(2) What happens if  $D$  is disqualified?


# The IIA Criterion

## Independence-Of-Irrelevant-Alternatives (IIA) Criterion:

*If Candidate A is the winner of an election, and Candidate B is suddenly disqualified, then A **should** still win the election.*

We have just seen that the Method of Pairwise Comparisons violates IIA.

Unfortunately, **none** of the systems we have studied always meet the IIA Criterion!



**IT'S A DISASTER!!!!**

# Comparison of Voting Methods

|                      | Maj | Cond | PE  | Mono | IIA |
|----------------------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|
| Plurality            | Yes | No   | No  | Yes  | No  |
| Borda Count          | No  | No   | Yes | Yes  | No  |
| Plurality-With-Elim. | Yes | No   | Yes | No   | No  |
| Pairwise Comparisons | Yes | Yes  | Yes | Yes  | No  |

Maj = Majority; Cond = Condorcet;

PE = Public-Enemy; Mono = Monotonicity;

IIA = Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

# Which Voting System Is Best?

**So, which voting system is best?**

There is no purely mathematical answer to this question.

**Arrow's Theorem: There is no voting system that always satisfies all four voting criteria – Majority, Condorcet, Monotonicity and IIA.**

So, the answer depends which fairness criteria you think are the most important.